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ABSTRACT 
 
The Euro As More Than a Currency:  How Salient Is the European Single Currency to 
Europeans. (April 2010) 
 
Laura Jo Hayes 
Department of Political Science 
Department of History 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. John Robertson 
Department of Political Science 
 
This study moves past traditional studies of euro approval based on demographics and 
examines the euro within a two dimensional identity framework.  Using Eurobarometer 
survey data from both 2003 and 2008, this study establishes that an intrinsic relationship 
between nominal identity toward the euro and nominal identity toward the EU exists in 
the minds of Europeans. The second identity dimension examines the relative-oriented 
identity of Europeans toward the euro and EU.  It establishes that relative-oriented 
identity toward the euro and EU, reflected by a cognitive assessment of an individual‟s 
perception of the EU, is firmly imbedded within one‟s nominal identity toward the EU 
and euro.  In addition, this relative-oriented identity is so firmly rooted in this nominal 
identity correlation that it remains unaffected by national issues.  Because the euro is so 
inextricably bound to EU identity, politicians and governments must be very purposeful 
in their treatment of the euro.  It becomes more than a utilitarian tool.  It is an integral 
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aspect of the European Union and the identity associated with it.  Harming the euro 
could have drastic repercussions for the development of a European identity.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union is a unique experiment in government structure.  As national 
governments in Europe voluntarily surrender sovereignty to this international 
government, the legitimacy of this regime is called into question.  The euro and the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) represent the most significant and daring examples of 
this surrendered sovereignty.  It is by far the largest exertion and demonstration of 
European Union power to date as the nations participating in the EMU are obligated to 
abide by the rules and regulations set forth by the EMU.   
 
In order for the European Union to be viewed as legitimate, it must be seen as both a 
valid and effective supplement or in some areas replacement to the nation-state.  In the 
same manner, the euro, in order to serve as a legitimate currency, must be seen as an 
effective replacement for the currency of the nation-state.  For the euro to be legitimate, 
it must be seen as a valid and effective replacement of the nation-state‟s currency, as a 
symbol and representative of national sovereignty and authority, and indeed, as a valid 
and effective instrument of EU regime authority.  The euro, in essence, should be 
understood to be the most legitimate and only true expression of what can be seen as a 
European Union based regime authority.   The euro is controlled solely by the European 
Union through the authority mechanism of the EMU.
1
 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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The EMU is different than the other institutions that comprise the European Union.  
While the European Court of Justice, European Commission, and European Parliament 
contribute to the input legitimacy of the EU regime, they remain inherently tied to the 
nation-state.  These institutions are based on nation-state proportional allocations of 
legitimacy. The euro and European Monetary Union, in turn, are not based on 
proportional allocations from the nation-state.  Rather, they are managed by, sanctioned 
by, and exercised by European Union (Eurozone wide) authority.  The euro and EMU 
arguable function without any significant basis of authority in proportional nation-state 
interests.   
 
In the era of global economics and increasing financial integration, money and monetary 
stability are pivotal to the realization of the interests and aspirations of the individuals 
living within any political or economic system.  The same is true for the European Union 
and EMU.  The following questions for the European Union arise:  Is the political 
economic regime of the euro and that of the political regime of the EU one in the same?  
Does an individual‟s apparent support for legitimacy of the EU political regime transfer 
to that of the economic regime of the euro?   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There has been much discussion on the existence of legitimacy within the context of the 
European Union.  The term “democratic legitimacy” refers to the use of governing 
authority.  In essence, it refers to the authority of a governing structure to make decisions 
that are collectively binding, implement decisions using resources from those within the 
collectivity, and the ability to resort to legitimate coercion (Scharpf 1998).  Arguments 
concerning legitimacy are thus arguments that establish a moral duty in that individuals 
feel obligated to follow collectively binding decisions regardless of their individual 
preferences.    Within this framework, there are two different types of legitimacy, input 
and output legitimacy.  Input legitimacy is derived from the authentic expression of 
preference of the collectivity governed.  When the binding decisions of government 
contribute to the common good of the community, output legitimacy is expressed.  The 
government in these instances is using its power to solve community issues that the 
individual cannot control on a personal basis (Sharpf 1998).  Current literature maintains 
that attitudes toward the EU are a major determinant of euro acceptance (Meier-Pesti & 
Kirchler, 2003). It is within this context that the euro falls.  The euro is the main exhibit 
of output legitimacy that European Union citizens encounter daily.  Thus, it is important 
to explore the relationship between the euro and European identity.   
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The European Union has made an effort to create a set of symbols including a new 
currency to generate among community members a sense of belonging to this new 
political and economic community (Bruter, 2003).  Previous literature has established 
that currency functions as not only a tool to harbor national identity, but it also functions 
as a tool to foster European identity (Kaelberer, 2004).  Broadly, the EMU to an extent is 
not a unique creation but has historical roots.  Kaelberer argues that the relationship 
between collective identity and currency is reciprocal in nature.  For currency to function 
properly, the users must possess a degree of collective identity.  In his exploration of the 
level of European identity needed for successful functioning of the euro, he argues that 
the key aspect of identity needed in this relationship is trust.  Trust, Kaelberer argues, 
has become a rather abstract and institutionalized idea.  Deep affective feelings of 
belonging are not necessary in this modern relationship of trust.  Rather, diffuse identity 
rooted in utilitarian attributes and as a part of the hybrid European identity is sufficient 
(2004).   
 
Current research also suggests that the euro is essential to the construction of a European 
identity, but in a far different manner than that of traditional nation-state identity.  The 
supranational nature of the euro mandates a difference in approach and identity 
construction (Poe & Wurtz, 2009).  In essence, the euro functions as a tool within 
European identity.  This study aims to explore nominal identity individuals possess 
toward both the EU and euro.  The question we will be exploring is to what extent is the 
  5 
euro imbedded within European identity. Essentially, is the euro intrinsically tied to 
European identity? 
 
Research maintains that national identity and European identity are not exclusive 
identities.  An individual can possess both national identity and European identity.  An 
individual‟s European identity should vary independently of their national identity 
(Bruter, 2003).  Thus, the degree of nominal identity in the EU and euro in the mind of a 
European should hold regardless, begging the question:  Does the EMU status of a 
person‟s nation-state influence the degree of shared nominal identity in the EU and the 
euro? 
 
 Current literature tends to focus on demographic and attudinal characteristics as 
determinants of approval of the economic regime of the euro (Fischer & Hahn 2010) 
(Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2008).  This project aims to fill that gap by evaluating how 
nominal identity towards the EU and euro fit within the framework of relative-oriented 
identity.  In essence, this paper asks how the nominal identity toward the euro fairs 
against the litmus test of personal perceptions of the EU, as well as against the influence 
of national issues? 
 
Prior to the establishment of the euro, being European was rarely associated with 
individuals‟ personal identity (Meier-Pesto & Kirchler, 2003).  Rather, national identities 
were important pieces of the construction of a personal identity.  Because the nation is 
  6 
such a broad concept, individuals develop social representations of the nation, and the 
nation becomes an imagined community.  The more congruence between an individual‟s 
social representations of their nation and their personal identity, the closer an individual 
feels and more allegiance an individual possess towards the nation.  These individuals 
will show a high identity with their nation-state.  As power shifts from the national level 
to the supranational level, people begin forming a supranational or European identity.  
This European identity is derived from the nation-states‟ membership to the EU.  The 
development of this identity may be influenced by the conversion to the euro currency.  
Those individuals who believe in European economic and political prosperity are likely 
to support the euro.  Those, however, who fear the EU are not likely to approve of the 
euro (Meier-Pesto & Kirchler, 2003).    
 
There is a cognitive association between perceptions of the euro and the EU.  This study 
aims to further explore the degree to which relative-oriented identity in the EU, reflected 
by a European‟s cognitive assessment of the EU, is imbedded within that person‟s 
nominal identity toward the euro. We will be exploring how the assessment of the EU as 
something to fear is tied to a person‟s nominal identity toward the euro. The relationship 
between the assessment of the EU as something that offers increasing possibilities and 
nominal identity toward the euro will also be evaluated.  In addition, we will also 
explore the relationship between the perception of the EU as something which offers 
opportunity and nominal identity toward the euro will be evaluated.  Through these 
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evaluations, we will establish that the relative-oriented identity of the EU based on 
assessment of the EU is imbedded within the nominal identity toward the euro. 
Previous research maintains that there is a low level of information to individuals 
regarding the process of European integration.  As a result of this information gap, 
Europeans resort to proxies when contemplating European integration issues.  These 
proxies are most likely to be imbedded within national political issues (De Vreese).   
 
Marco Antonsich (2008) argues that the idea of the EU and Europe at large should be 
evaluated in the context of national views.  National issues, Anonsich argues, shape the 
manner in which individuals view themselves and the world at large including the 
European Union.  This study will examine the way in which relative-oriented shared 
identity of the EU and euro is conditioned by the salience of national issues to the 
individual. 
 
By answering the question presented throughout this literature review, a firmer grasp of 
the state of the euro within the minds of European will be attained.  This is essential 
given the current tumultuous climate of the global economy.  If the euro is intrinsically 
tied to the EU in terms of both nominal and relative-oriented shared identity, it cannot 
wisely be used by politicians as a political football.  Rather, to threaten the euro would 
be to threaten the EU itself and vice versa.  Neither institution can exist separate from 
the other.  This knowledge is essential for policymakers as they address integration 
issues of widening and deepening the EU. If the euro is a salient symbol of European 
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identity, it can serve as a tool for further integration.  In Chapter III of this study, the 
theories, concepts, and variables to be discussed will be outlined.  In Chapter IV, the 
methods used to operationalize the study will be detailed as well as an analysis of the 
findings will be presented.  In Chapter V, the conclusions of the study and their 
implications are presented.   
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND VARIABLES 
 
It is the intention of this study to examine the two dimensions of the identity integration 
and implied shared legitimacy of the euro and the European Union.  The first dimension 
of identity highlights the broad attitudes of an individual toward the EU and euro in the 
form of nominal identity.  The second dimension is a reflection of an individual‟s 
cognitive perceptions of the broader social meaning of the EU and by implication, if it is 
imbedded within the nominal identity toward the EU, the euro.  The hypotheses outlined 
in Table 1 will be used to examine these dimensions. 
TABLE 1 
Hypothesis Table 
1 
One's nominal identity toward the EU is intrinsically tied to the nominal identity toward 
the euro of the individual. 
2 
The degree of shared nominal identity in the EU and euro in the mind of a European is 
held regardless of the EMU status of the person's nation-state 
3 
The degree of shared nominal identity in the EU and in the euro in the mind of a 
Europeans grows, or appreciably gains, between 2003 and 2008. 
4 
The degree of relative-oriented identity in the EMU reflected by the European's cognitive 
assessment of the EU as something offering expanded possibilities for the future rather 
than restricted opportunities, is imbedded within (or identical with that of) that person's 
nominal identity toward the euro. 
5 
The degree of relative-oriented identity in the EU, reflected by the European's cognitive 
assessment for the EU as something offering expanded possibilities for the future rather 
than limited possibilities, is embedded within that person's nominal identity toward the 
euro. 
6 
Relative-oriented shared identity of the EU and Europeans in the European's mind holds 
regardless of the EMU status of that person's nation-state. 
7 
Relative-oriented identity of the EU and euro grows, or appreciable gains, between 2003 
and 2008. 
 
 
In order to evaluate both nominal and relative-oriented identity in each of the hypotheses 
outlined in Table 1, data pertaining to the attitudes of individuals toward the EU and 
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euro must be explored.  To do so, we examine attitudes toward the EU and attitudes 
toward the euro.  These attitudes were measured using Eurobarometer survey data 
provided by the European Commission in both 2003 and 2008
1
.  Original survey items 
were used for this purpose from the Eurobarometer.  Table 2 demonstrates what survey 
questions and variables were used to explore various concepts throughout the project.   
In order to study relative-oriented identity, individual perceptions of the EU and, if 
imbedded, the euro must be examined.  In addition, the study also examines the 
influence of national issues on EU identity and euro approval.  Survey data was also 
used to evaluate this variable. 
                                                 
1
 Survey data was used from the Eurobarometer 59.1 and 69.2 because identical questions were used in 
both studies, allowing for a comparison over time.   
  11 
 
TABLE 2 
Primary Concepts Variables, and Respective Operationalizations and Measurements 
Concepts Variables Operationalizations and Measurements 
Nominal 
Identity 
with the 
Economic 
Regime 
Support for the 
euro 
Q:  What is your opinion of the following statements? A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the 
euro  
Choices: For, Against, DK  
Recode: For = 1 Against = 2 
Nominal 
Identity 
with the 
Political 
Regime 
Support/Attitude 
towards the EU 
Q:  Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is…?  
Choice: a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, DK 
 Recoded into: A Good Thing = 1, Ambivalent = 2, Bad Thing = 3  
Relative 
Identity 
with the 
EU 
Fear 
Connotation 
Q: What does the European Union mean to you personally?  
Choices: peace, economic prosperity, social protection, freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the EU, 
cultural diversity, stronger say in the world, euro, unemployment, bureaucracy, waste of money, loss of our 
cultural identity, more crime, not enough control at external frontiers Recode: Individual respondent scores derived 
from factor analysis which identifies three unique identities: fear, opportunity, and possibility. For each of those 
derived variables, an individual was assigned a ratio-level score (z-score). Scores beneath 0 indicated a strong 
absence of this attribute (fear, possibility, or opportunity). Scores above 0 indicated a strong presence of this 
attribute.  Scores near 0 indicated a modicum of the attribute.   
Possibility 
Connotation 
Opportunity 
Connotation 
National 
Issue 
Salience 
National 
Economic 
Issues Salience 
Q:  What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?  
Choices: economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, pensions  
Recodes: We logically conclude that these choices would fall into national economic issues.  Each respondent was 
asked to choose two choices among the total range of choices that encompass not only national economic issues 
but also entail the choices for national social welfare issues, as well as physical and national security issues. If a 
respondents two choices were from the set of choices that we define as national economic issue salience, this 
person was assigned a score of two and labeled “salient”.   If a respondent chose one of the choices from the 
choice set we define as national economic issue salience that respondent was assigned a value of 1 and labeled 
“ambivalent”.  If  a respondent selected none of the choices in the choice set used to define national economic 
issues salience, that respondent was assigned a score of 0 and labeled “non-issue”. 
National Social/ 
Welfare Issues 
Salience 
Q:  What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? 
 Choices: Housing, health care system, educational system, protecting the environment  
 Recodes: We logically conclude that these choices would fall into national social welfare issues.  Each respondent 
was asked to choose two choices among the total range of choices that encompass not only national social welfare 
issues but also entail the choices for national social welfare issues, as well as physical and national security issues. 
If a respondents two choices were from the set of choices that we define as national social welfare issue salience, 
this person was assigned a score of two and labeled “salient”.   If a respondent chose one of the choices from the 
choice set we define as national social welfare issue salience that respondent was assigned a value of 1 and labeled 
“ambivalent”.  If  a respondent selected none of the choices in the choice set used to define national social welfare 
issues salience, that respondent was assigned a score of 0 and labeled “non-issue”. 
Physical and 
National 
Security Issue 
Salience 
Q:  What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? 
 Choices: crime, terrorism, defence/foreign affairs, immigration   
Recodes: We logically conclude that these choices would fall into national security issues.  Each respondent was 
asked to choose two choices among the total range of choices that encompass not only national security issues but 
also entail the choices for national social welfare issues, as well as physical and national security issues. If a 
respondents two choices were from the set of choices that we define as national security issue salience, this person 
was assigned a score of two and labeled “salient”.   If a respondent chose one of the choices from the choice set we 
define as national security issue salience that respondent was assigned a value of 1 and labeled “ambivalent”.  If  a 
respondent selected none of the choices in the choice set used to define national security issues salience, that 
respondent was assigned a score of 0 and labeled “non-issue”. 
Time Sample Year Eurobarometer 59.12 and Eurobarometer 69.23 
Space 
EMU Status 
2003 EMU includes Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Austria, Finland  
2003 Non-EMU includes Denmark, United Kingdom, Sweden  
2008 EMU includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Greece, Portugal  
2008 Non-EMU includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom 
                                                 
2
 European Commission, 2003. “The Euro and Parental Leave,” Eurobarometer 59.1 
3
 European Commission, 2008. “National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, 
and Climate Change,” Eurobarometer 69.2 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
 
Throughout the study, approval of the euro is the dependent variable.  Table 3 explores 
the nominal identity toward the euro and EU of Europeans between 2003 and 2008 using 
crosstab analysis.  It is not the intention of the EU to create a new culture.   Individuals 
must show commitment to the political and economic regime.  The EU cannot generate a 
new culture.  Rather, culture is brought to the EU.  Thus, there should be little difference 
in the nominal identity of individuals toward the euro and EU within and outside of the 
EMU.  Over time, this identity should strengthen and grow. As seen in the table between 
2003 and 2008, there is a decrease in support for the euro.  In some nations, this decrease 
is rather significant
4
.  In addition, there does seem to be a degree of difference between 
EMU and Non-EMU nations in terms of euro approval.  Thus, the euro is not as firmly 
imbedded within the nominal identity individual‟s possess towards the EU and is subject 
to change given external factors like the beginning of a financial crisis as seen in the 
beginning of 2008. 
                                                 
4 As a result, crosstabs were run for each country and the independent variables used throughout the 
studies.  The tau, gamma, and chi square reported in our aggregate models also show up in the same 
direction and have the same strength for each individual country. Again, the exceptions are Luxembourg 
and Latvia where the statistical significance falls off. There is no logical accounting for this, none anyway 
that seems logically apparent. If we controlled merely for Latvia and Luxembourg given their tiny N, it 
would do nothing to our reported aggregate findings, so we may dismiss these anomalies associated with 
these two countries as merely artifacts of unique cultural and/or sampling flukes 
  13 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Percentage of Respondents Reporting Support For Euro Currency,  
by Country and Sampling Year 
 
Country 
2003 
 
2008 
Percentage 
Change 2003 –  
2008 
For Sample For Sample 
 
EMU Countries 
 
% N % N 
Austria 79.2 933 69.8 906 -11.87% 
Belgium 88.2 1047 83 989 -5.90% 
Cyprus 
  
62.6 473 
 Finland 76.9 1015 78.7 999 2.34% 
France 79.4 1040 73.3 1043 -7.68% 
Germany 73.3 1928 70.7 1501 -3.55% 
Greece 74.3 977 50.7 497 -31.76% 
Ireland 83.2 947 89.6 953 7.69% 
Italy 86.3 1053 68 975 -21.21% 
Luxembourg 88.8 446 85.2 366 -4.05% 
Malta 
  
75.7 448 
 Netherlands 69.4 980 80.1 1022 15.42% 
Portugal 78.7 1018 61.6 937 -21.73% 
Slovakia1 
  
65 1031 
 Slovenia 
  
91.8 980 
 Spain 81.2 938 70.4 933 -13.30% 
Country Mean 79.9 
 
73.5 
 
-7.99% 
Aggregate % 79.1 12279 73.2 14486 -7.46% 
 
Non-EMU Countries 
(2003 & 2008) 
 
  Denmark 57.6 929 55 439 -4.51% 
Sweden 48.3 887 52.7 953 9.11% 
UK 33.3 1121 30.4 1162 -8.71% 
Country Mean 46.4 
 
46 
 
-0.79% 
Aggregate % 45.5 2534 45 3088 -1.10% 
 
Non-EMU Countries 
(2008) 
  Bulgaria 
  
81.2 860 
 Czech Republic 
  
53.6 963 
 Estonia 
  
61.1 921 
 Hungary 
  
71.8 872 
 Latvia 
  
59.1 903 
 Lithuania 
  
63.2 929 
 Poland 
  
53.3 921 
 Romania 
  
84.3 899 
 Country Mean2 
  
60.5 
  Aggregate %3 
  
59.5 10352 
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If the European Union has legitimacy in the eyes of Europeans, individuals view the EU 
as a supplement or replacement to the nation-state.  In the case of the euro, the EMU 
replaces the economic regime of the nation-state.  Thus, the euro becomes one of the 
only transnational symbols of the EU as well as its only exertion of extensive output 
legitimacy.  The first hypothesis holds that one's nominal identity toward the EU is 
intrinsically tied to the nominal identity toward the euro of the individual.  
Crosstabulation analysis is employed to evaluate the nature of the relationship between 
approval of EU membership and approval of the euro.  Table 4 presents the results of 
this analysis.  The results reported in Table 4 underscore the existence of an intrinsic 
relationship between approval of the euro and a positive view of EU membership.  Table 
4 also reveals that a positive view of EU membership often necessitates a favorable 
evaluation of the euro.  Of those who view EU membership as a “good thing”, 90.1% of 
respondents also support the euro.  This serves as evidence that people‟s disposition 
towards the euro is imbedded in their perceptions and assessment of the EU. Thus, an 
intrinsic relationship exists between the nominal identity of Europeans toward the EU 
and nominal identity of Europeans toward the euro.  
 
Over time, this identity correlation should grow as people increasingly utilize the euro, 
and the benefits of the monetary system are more widely distributed.  In non-EMU 
nations, one would actually expect a sharper curve of increased approval of the euro over 
time.  Logically it can be expected that if the euro is imbedded into one‟s perceptions of 
the EU, non-EMU nations (most of who are in Eastern Europe) will want to adopt the 
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euro because of individual‟s connotative associations of the euro with opportunity and 
possibility.  One of the ultimate tenants of EU membership is the eventual adoption of 
the euro as a currency.  As time passes, the nations who are not members of the EMU 
(with the exception of Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom who have secured 
EMU opt-outs) move increasingly closer to adoption of the euro, generating an increase 
in support for the EMU.  As these nations move farther from the point of entry and 
closer to euro adoption, they should experience an increase in this identity function 
correlation.  
  16 
 
TABLE 4 
Approval of the Euro within the Context of Approval of the EU, 2003-2008 
  Evaluation of EU Membership, 2003 EMU1   
Evaluation of EU Membership, 2003 Non-
EMU2 
  
Good 
Thing Ambivalent 
Bad 
Thing N   
Good 
Thing Ambivalent 
Bad 
Thing N 
For the Euro 90.1% 70.1% 38.0% 
79.9
% 
For the 
Euro 74.9% 28.6% 8.9% 
47.1
% 
Against the 
Euro 9.9% 29.9% 61.6% 
20.1
% 
Against 
the Euro 25.1% 71.4% 91.1% 
52.9
% 
N 7410 3144 1091 
1164
5 N 1385 709 671 2765 
  Evaluation of EU Membership, 2008 EMU3   
Evaluation of EU Membership, 2008 Non-
EMU4 
  
Good 
Thing Ambivalent 
Bad 
Thing N   
Good 
Thing Ambivalent 
Bad 
Thing N 
For the Euro 88.6% 61.4% 37.0% 
73.7
% 
For the 
Euro 76.9% 49.7% 22.3% 
60.0
% 
Against the 
Euro 11.4% 38.6% 63.0% 
26.3
% 
Against 
the Euro 23.1% 50.3% 77.7% 
40.0
% 
N 8037 4220 1849 
1410
6 N 5284 3242 1487 10013 
  
Evaluation of EU Membership, 2008 Non-
EMU ('03)5   
   
  
  
Good 
Thing Ambivalent 
Bad 
Thing N   
   
  
For the Euro 71.2% 28.4% 10.2% 
45.6
%   
   
  
Against the 
Euro 28.8% 71.6% 89.8% 
54.4
%   
   
  
N 1504 761 722 2987           
1x2=1837.719 
      
2x2= 920.292 
         
3x2=2539.586 
         
4x2=1654.743 
         
5x2= 852.413 
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According to Table 4, however, this identity correlation among EMU members has 
actually experienced a slight decrease over time.  In 2003, 90.1% of respondents within 
the EMU who viewed the EU as a “good thing” were for the euro.  By 2008, this number 
had decreased to 88.6%. While there was no significant growth in this identity 
correlation, the decline was small and could be attributed to a variety of factors including 
the beginnings of the global recession in 2008.  There is no large gain made in the 
identity correlation at the Non-EMU level; however, in non-EMU member nations, this 
identity function correlation increased between 2003 and 2008.  In 2003, 74.9% of 
respondents outside of the EMU approved of the euro and held a positive view of EU 
membership.  As nations outside of the EMU began to experience the recession, they 
increasingly identified the financial incentives and protections associated with EMU 
membership.  By 2008, this identity function correlation grew to 76.9%. As these nations 
move closer to joining the EMU, this identity function also increases.  However, in the 
case of Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, 74.9% of respondents who viewed 
the EU positively also approved of the euro, but by 2008, this number decreased to 
71.2%.  This is a small decrease, and as mentioned previously, these nations by 2008 
most likely began to feel the negative pressures of the global economic recession, 
generating a slowly increasing negative view of the euro.  Because these nations have 
secured opt-outs of the EMU, they have no real intentions of joining the EMU.  As such, 
their identity is not as reliant on the EMU because the euro to them is a utilitarian aspect 
of trade rather than a fundamental function of everyday life. 
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In order to evaluate the second dimension of identity integration (one‟s relative oriented 
identity with the EU), we organized personal perceptions of the EU into three general 
categories.  These three general categories are fear (indicating that the EU connotes to 
the individual a reasonable degree of risk to one‟s person or social economic well-
being), possibility (indicating that the EU connotes contingent conditions for one‟s 
personal success and prosperity), and opportunity (indicating that the EU connotes to the 
individual real and immediate chance based on the discretion of the individual to take 
advantage of circumstances designed to enhance one‟s personal prosperity and well-
being).  These three categories represent the content of one‟s personal identity with the 
EU.  If there is a strong correlation between the euro and EU then we expect a strong 
correlation between the euro and these three dimensions of personal perceptions of the 
EU.   Thus, we argue that the euro becomes part of one‟s personal identity.  To identify 
these dimensions of one‟s personal perceptions of what the EU connotes, a principal 
components factor analysis was performed on a pooled sample from the 2003 and 2008 
Eurobarometer data.  From this factor analysis, we identified three dimensions of one‟s 
personal perceptions of what the EU connotes to that individual (fear, possibility, and 
opportunity).  From this analysis, a factor score was derived for each individual in the 
pooled sample, empirically indicating the extent to which the identified connotation was 
a defined attribute of the individual‟s personal perception of the EU.  Table 5 reports the 
rotated component matrix of the factor analysis.  From this table, we see the three unique 
factor dimensions which maximize the variance within the pooled sample.  The 14 
variables employed are noted in Table 5.  Using factor loading, three dimensions were 
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identified that maximized variance.  In each survey, there were 14 unique choices (these 
were identical choices for each survey) of which the respondent was required at 
minimum to select one.  Following conventional practice within the literature, the 
criteria for determining whether an individual variable is included within one dimension 
or the other is based upon the size of the individual‟s variables factor loading within 
each of the respective dimensions.  Conventionally, a factor loading of at least .4 is used 
as a cut-off for including a variable within a factor dimension.  Based on this criterion, 
we have attached to each dimension a term which captures the root meaning of this 
dimension.  As seen in Table 5, bureaucracy, loss of cultural identity, unemployment, 
waste of money, more crime, and not enough control at external borders were 
characteristics that respondents were likely to use when expressing perceived fear of 
what the EU connotes.  In this case, the EU connotes fear associated with the denigration 
of society‟s economic prosperity and well-being as well as one‟s sense of control and the 
security one gains from national identity.  These terms were grouped under the label 
“fear”.  These characteristics have a more pessimistic tone concerning the development 
of the European Union.  A certain degree of fear is also expressed in regards to the 
products and implication of the European Union.  The term “possibilities” was used to 
describe the next group which included peace, economic prosperity, social protection, 
and stronger say in the world.  These attributes ascribed to the EU by respondents 
highlight the potential benefits of EU membership.  They do not necessitate that EU 
membership is automatically positive, but rather there are now more options for positive 
outcomes as a result of EU membership.  The final group including freedom to travel, 
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study, and work anywhere in the EU, cultural diversity, and the euro was labeled 
“opportunity”5.  These attributes point to the increased likelihood of advancement as 
well as underscore the advantages of EU membership that are afforded to each 
individual and that are far less contingent on subsequent conditions before the individual 
can enjoy the benefits of these attributes.   
 
Following the identification of these three unique dimensions based on the factor loading 
assigned each of the 14 unique variables, an individual factor score was computed and 
assigned to each respondent in the pooled sample.  The factor scores represent a 
standardized measure of the extent to which the individual dimension is a prevalent 
characteristic of the individual‟s patterned responses across the 14 variables upon which 
the factor analysis was based.  For instance, a score that is strongly less than 0 for the 
fear dimension must be interpreted as indicating that this individual is absent a personal 
perception of the EU that connotes a concern that the EU is harmful to that person‟s 
well-being and prosperity.  In essence, this respondent would actually be properly 
described as an individual who holds positive expectations, indeed is hopeful, about her 
future based on her perceptions of what the EU means to her personally.  A score that is 
strongly above 0 should be interpreted as indicating a respondent who harbors distinct 
fears about what the EU connotes for her and her society‟s prosperity and well-being.  A 
respondent who has a score that is approximately 0 should be interpreted as an 
individual who has a pattern of responses on the variables used to define the fear 
                                                 
5
 The euro has relative identity under this item as it falls well within opportunity set. 
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dimension which reflects a degree of ambivalence across the variables defining this 
dimension.  In other words, there is no distinct pattern to that individual‟s responses 
across these variables.  This is therefore a person who is best described as being 
ambivalent in their personal connotation of what the EU means to that person 
personally.
6
   
 
 
                                                 
6
 As the factor analysis was based on a pooled sample, subsequent analysis comparing changes between 
the 2003 sample and the 2008 sample merely require that we distinguish a respondent as being part of the 
2003 sample or the 2008 sample.  There factor score is indicative of the extent to which they hold 
connotations of the EU consistent with fear, possibility, or opportunity for that time period 2003 (if the 
respondent was in the 2003 sample) or 2008 (if the respondent was in the 2008 sample). 
 
TABLE 5 
Rotated Component Matrix Defining Vectors Identified with the European Union in 3 
Personal Identity Dimensions, 2003 – 2008a 
 
Component 
Variable Fear Possibility Opportunity 
Bureaucracy 0.499 -0.092 0.221 
Loss of Our Cultural Identity 0.456 -0.069 -0.124 
Unemployment 0.572 0.112 -0.183 
Waste of Money 0.624 -0.160 -0.088 
More Crime 0.662 0.014 0.026 
Not Enough Control at External Borders 0.555 -0.025 0.135 
Peace 0.012 0.612 0.083 
Economic Prosperity 0.150 0.618 0.044 
Social Protection 0.012 0.706 -0.068 
Stronger Say in the World 0.096 0.409 0.379 
Freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the 
EU 0.067 0.026 0.722 
Cultural Diversity 0.046 0.238 0.629 
Euro 0.019 -0.075 0.520 
a 
Rotation Method: Varimax and Kaiser 
Normalization 
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In Table 6, it is apparent the relative-oriented identity toward the EU and euro, as 
measured by cognitive assessments of the EU in terms of fear, possibility, and 
opportunity, is firmly imbedded within a person‟s nominal identity toward the euro.  
These identity function correlations further signify that the euro is firmly embedded 
within the personal identity of Europeans.  
 
Notice in Table 6 that the tau and gamma do not change directions or significantly 
change in strength over time. Table 6 also supports the hypothesis that relative-oriented 
shared identity of the EU and euro in the European‟s mind holds regardless of the EMU 
status of that person‟s nation state. Yet, it can also be gathered from this table that this 
relative-oriented shared identity does not grow significantly for those nations outside of 
the EMU between 2003 and 2008.  It experiences a slight decrease which is almost 
negligible.  
 
The euro is part of both the nominal and relative-oriented identity of Europeans.  Thus, 
relative-oriented identity based on the intrinsic relationship existing between the euro 
and the EU is not conditioned by national issues.  If this identity was subject to national 
issues, the euro becomes a political football that can be used by policymakers.   
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As previous literature states, the idea of the EU is often too large for effective individual 
associations.  As such, Europeans use proxies which are most often national (De 
Vreese).  Thus, it is essential to examine the manner in which national issues condition 
European identity toward the euro.  To do so, survey data from the Eurobarometer was 
also used.  Responses to survey questions regarding personal importance of national 
issues were grouped by associative subject matter.  Economic situation, rising 
prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, and pensions were grouped as national 
economic issues.  Crime, terrorism, defense/ foreign affairs, and immigration were 
labeled as national security issues.  Housing, the health care system, the educational 
system, and protecting the environment were labeled as national social issues. These 
characteristics were recoded into separate variables reflecting these groupings. After 
running crosstab analysis, (see Appendix), it became overwhelmingly apparent that the 
identity function correlation is not conditioned by national issues.  Thus, the euro is 
firmly and intrinsically tied to nominal European identity.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Previous research has evaluated European identity and disposition towards the euro in 
terms of demographical characteristics.  In this study, we have established that approval 
of the euro is intrinsically tied to approval of the European Union.  There is in fact 
evidence that people‟s disposition toward the euro is imbedded within their disposition 
towards the EU.  As seen in Table 3, the degree of shared nominal identity varies from 
nation to nation.  Countries within the EMU have a higher approval rate for the euro 
while those outside of the EMU have a lower rate of approval.  The formation of this 
nominal identity is more dependent on sovereignty transfer than previously mentioned.  
Over time, this relationship among nations within the EMU has actually experienced a 
slight decrease, as well.  This is most likely a product of the global economic recession.  
However, among non-EMU nations, this relationship has actually strengthened.  It is to 
be expected that the approval curve would be sharper among non-EMU nations.  As 
these nations move away from the point of entering the EU, their proximity to euro 
adoption draws closer.  As nations near adoption, one would expect that euro approval 
would also increase.  There is an exception found in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden. While these were the only non-EMU nations in 2003, they have also secured 
euro opt-outs.  These nations thus have no intention of adopting the euro.   
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The euro is also firmly embedded within European personal identification with the EU.  
As seen in Table 6, the degree of relative-oriented shared identity in the EU is firmly 
imbedded within the matrix of what people associate with the European Union, 
particularly the dimensions of fear, possibility, and opportunity.  This remains the case 
regardless of the EMU status of the nation
7
.  Furthermore, the relative-oriented shared 
identity in the EU is not conditioned by national issues.  Regardless of the saliency of 
national issue importance, the relative-oriented shared identity of the EU and the euro 
still holds.  In addition, this relative-oriented identity unlike nominal identity increases 
between 2003 and 2008.  As such, the euro is firmly associated with the European Union 
in the minds of Europeans. Thus, the euro cannot be used as a manipulative tool by 
policymakers.  In effect, manipulating the euro would risk manipulating European Union 
identity overall.  In approaching policy initiatives, policymakers must be very mindful of 
the development of this relationship and in turn, adjust policy accordingly. Manipulating 
either the euro or European identity runs the risk of adversely affecting the other and 
could undermine the entire supranational experiment.  
 
Further research is both possible and needed to examine the nominal and relative-
oriented identity of Europeans toward the euro and EU.  A variety of analyses have yet 
to be run.  More advanced methods are available that allow hypothesis testing with more 
precise measurements.  For the purpose of this paper that builds on existing work, 
crosstabs were used to be consistent with other research.   
                                                 
7
 With the exception of Luxembourg and Latvia as discussed earlier.    
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 A separate survey asking direct and associative questions like “Do you approve of the 
euro and the European Union?” would be helpful and create more accurate data analysis.  
In addition, this identity function correlation could also be further examined in the 
context of European issues.  When current survey data becomes more available, this 
study should be reconstructed because results may have changed over the duration of the 
global financial crisis. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Economic Issues, 2003 
EMU 
  
National Economic Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 89.1% 90.3% 91.0% 90.1% 
 
Against Euro 10.9% 9.7% 9.0% 9.9% 
x
2 
=3.594
a
 N 2003 4001 1406 7410 
Ambivalent For Euro 70.0% 71.2% 67.7% 70.1% 
 
Against Euro 30.0% 28.8% 32.3% 29.9% 
x
2 
=2.919
b
 N 749 1670 725 3144 
Bad Thing For Euro 40.1% 36.7% 40.5% 38.4% 
 
Against Euro 59.9% 63.3% 59.5% 61.6% 
x
2 
=1.487
c
 N 284 580 227 1091 
 
TABLE A2 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2003 
EMU 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 91.1% 89.2% 88.1% 90.1% 
 
Against Euro 8.9% 10.8% 11.9% 9.9% 
x
2 
=9.052
a
 N 3859 3012 539 7410 
Ambivalent For Euro 70.2% 69.5% 72.6% 70.1% 
 
Against Euro 29.8% 30.5% 27.4% 29.9% 
x
2 
=.896
b
 N 1707 1207 230 3144 
Bad Thing For Euro 39.4% 35.0% 48.7% 38.4% 
 
Against Euro 60.6% 65.0% 51.3% 61.6% 
x
2 
=5.853
c
 N 601 412 78 1091 
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TABLE A3 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Social Issues, 2003 
EMU 
  
National Social Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 89.8% 90.7% 89.5% 90.1% 
 
Against Euro 10.2% 9.3% 10.5% 9.9% 
x
2 
=1.620
a
 N 4682 2452 276 7410 
Ambivalent For Euro 70.2% 69.8% 71.1% 70.1% 
 
Against Euro 29.8% 30.2% 289.9% 29.9% 
x
2 
=.114
b
 N 2062 992 90 3144 
Bad Thing For Euro 39.3% 37.5% 31.9% 38.4% 
 
Against Euro 60.7% 62.5% 68.1% 61.6% 
x
2 
=1.174
c
 N 695 349 47 1091 
 
TABLE A4 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Economic Issues, 2003 
Non-EMU 
  
National Economic Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 70.5% 78.4% 90.4% 74.9% 
 
Against Euro 29.5% 21.6% 9.6% 25.1% 
x
2 
=21.904
a
 N 732 570 83 1385 
Ambivalent For Euro 29.1% 27.3% 32.3% 28.6% 
 
Against Euro 70.9% 72.7% 67.7% 71.4% 
x
2 
=.444
b
 N 433 245 31 709 
Bad Thing For Euro 8.3% 10.9% 3.2% 8.9% 
 
Against Euro 91.7% 89.1% 96.8% 91.1% 
x
2 
=2.506
c
 N 410 230 31 671 
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TABLE A5 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2003 
Non-EMU 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 83.5% 70.3% 66.4% 74.9% 
 
Against Euro 16.5% 29.7% 33.6% 25.1% 
x
2 
=37.145
a
 N 556 606 223 1385 
Ambivalent For Euro 29.1% 31.7% 21.9% 28.6% 
 
Against Euro 70.9% 68.3% 78.1% 71.4% 
x
2 
=.4.807
b
 N 251 303 155 709 
Bad Thing For Euro 10.4% 8.9% 6.1% 8.9% 
 
Against Euro 89.6% 91.1% 93.9% 91.1% 
x
2 
=2.007
c
 N 269 271 131 671 
 
TABLE A6 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Social Issues, 2003 
Non-EMU 
  
National Social Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 74.0% 74.3% 86.0% 74.9% 
 
Against Euro 26.0% 25.7% 14.0% 25.1% 
x
2 
=6.522
a
 N 736 556 93 1385 
Ambivalent For Euro 27.3% 29.7% 32.7% 28.6% 
 
Against Euro 72.7% 70.3% 67.3% 71.4% 
x
2 
=.910
b
 N 374 283 52 709 
Bad Thing For Euro 7.9% 10.1% 9.7% 8.9% 
 
Against Euro 92.1% 89.9% 90.3% 91.1% 
x
2 
=.903
c
 N 341 268 62 671 
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TABLE A7 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Economic Issues, 2008 
EMU 
  
National Economic Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 90.8% 88.2% 86.3% 88.6% 
 
Against Euro 9.2% 11.8% 13.7% 11.4% 
x
2 
=20.175
a
 N 2464 4106 1467 8037 
Ambivalent For Euro 63.0% 61.8% 59.1% 61.4% 
 
Against Euro 37.0% 38.2% 40.9% 38.6% 
x
2 
=3.368
b
 N 921 2302 997 4220 
Bad Thing For Euro 36.6% 38.5% 33.6% 37.0% 
 
Against Euro 63.4% 61.5% 66.4% 63.0% 
x
2 
=3.037
c
 N 437 1010 402 1849 
 
TABLE A8 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2008 
EMU 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 88.7% 88.6% 87.0% 88.6% 
 
Against Euro 11.3% 11.4% 13.0% 11.4% 
x
2 
=.781
a
 N 5290 2454 293 8037 
Ambivalent For Euro 61.1% 62.1% 61.5% 61.4% 
 
Against Euro 38.9% 37.9% 38.5% 38.6% 
x
2 
=.293
b
 N 3001 1110 109 4220 
Bad Thing For Euro 38.4% 34.9% 31.9% 37.0% 
 
Against Euro 61.6% 65.1% 68.1% 63.0% 
x
2 
=2.872
c
 N 1189 588 72 1849 
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TABLE A9 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2008 
EMU 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 87.5% 89.6% 92.7% 88.6% 
 
Against Euro 12.5% 10.4% 7.3% 11.4% 
x
2 
=16.554
a
 N 4389 3196 452 8037 
Ambivalent For Euro 61.1% 62.6% 55.9% 61.4% 
 
Against Euro 38.9% 37.4% 44.1% 38.6% 
x
2 
=3.817
b
 N 2406 1603 211 4220 
Bad Thing For Euro 36.7% 37.9% 32.8% 37.0% 
 
Against Euro 63.3% 62.1% 67.2% 63.0% 
x
2 
=.740
c
 N 1135 647 67 1849 
 
TABLE A10 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Economic Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU 
  
National Economic Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 73.9% 77.5% 81.5% 76.9% 
 
Against Euro 26.1% 22.5% 18.5% 23.1% 
x
2 
=19.307
a
 N 1760 2714 810 5284 
Ambivalent For Euro 39.9% 50.6% 60.7% 49.7% 
 
Against Euro 60.1% 49.4% 39.3% 50.3% 
x
2 
=68.351
b
 N 914 1644 684 3242 
Bad Thing For Euro 16.7% 23.4% 32.3% 22.3% 
 
Against Euro 83.3% 76.6% 67.7% 77.7% 
x
2 
=24.514
c
 N 564 688 235 1487 
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TABLE A11 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 78.5% 74.8% 65.8% 76.9% 
 
Against Euro 21.5% 25.2% 34.2% 23.1% 
x
2 
=22.277
a
 N 3442 1655 187 5284 
Ambivalent For Euro 53.4% 42.6% 35.2% 49.7% 
 
Against Euro 46.6% 57.4% 64.8% 50.3% 
x
2 
=41.080
b
 N 2220 894 128 3242 
Bad Thing For Euro 26.0% 19.3% 8.9% 22.3% 
 
Against Euro 74.0% 80.7% 91.1% 77.7% 
x
2 
=23.271
c
 N 866 486 135 1487 
 
TABLE A12 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Social Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU 
  
National Social Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 77.9% 76.3% 73.3% 76.9% 
 
Against Euro 22.1% 23.7% 26.7% 23.1% 
x
2 
=4.454
a
 N 2646 2290 348 5284 
Ambivalent For Euro 53.2% 45.4% 48.1% 49.7% 
 
Against Euro 46.8% 54.6% 51.9% 50.3% 
x
2 
=17.931
b
 N 1729 1305 208 3242 
Bad Thing For Euro 23.4% 20.7% 21.8% 22.3% 
 
Against Euro 76.6% 79.3% 78.2% 77.7% 
x
2 
=1.440
c
 N 834 566 87 1487 
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TABLE A13 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Economic Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU ('03) 
  
National Economic Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 70.7% 71.6% 76.5% 71.2% 
 
Against Euro 29.3% 28.4% 23.5% 28.8% 
x
2 
=.836
a
 N 901 552 51 1504 
Ambivalent For Euro 30.0% 26.3% 23.5% 28.4% 
 
Against Euro 70.0% 73.7% 76.5% 71.6% 
x
2 
=1.544
b
 N 457 270 34 761 
Bad Thing For Euro 12.2% 7.4% 7.4% 10.2% 
 
Against Euro 87.8% 92.6% 92.6% 89.8% 
x
2 
=4.430
c
 N 425 270 27 722 
 
TABLE A14 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Security Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU ('03) 
  
National Security Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 75.4% 67.3% 65.5% 71.2% 
 
Against Euro 24.6% 32.7% 34.5% 28.8% 
x
2 
=13.301
a
 N 760 602 142 1504 
Ambivalent For Euro 31.3% 25.8% 27.2% 28.4% 
 
Against Euro 68.8% 74.2% 72.8% 71.6% 
x
2 
=2.508
b
 N 336 322 103 761 
Bad Thing For Euro 11.6% 9.6% 9.0% 10.2% 
 
Against Euro 88.4% 90.4% 91.0% 89.8% 
x
2 
=.911
c
 N 276 313 133 722 
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TABLE A15 
Evaluation of Euro Approval Conditioned by National Social Issues, 2008 
Non-EMU ('03) 
  
National Social Issue 
EU Membership View 
Approval of 
Euro None Ambivalent Salient Total 
Good Thing For Euro 70.1% 71.6% 75.2% 71.2% 
 
Against Euro 29.9% 28.4% 24.8% 28.8% 
x
2 
=1.429
a
 N 668 715 121 1504 
Ambivalent For Euro 28.1% 26.0% 42.6% 28.4% 
 
Against Euro 71.9% 74.0% 57.4% 71.6% 
x
2 
=6.996
b
 N 377 323 61 761 
Bad Thing For Euro 8.5% 11.2% 20.5% 10.2% 
 
Against Euro 91.5% 88.8% 79.5% 89.8% 
x
2 
=6.558
c
 N 400 278 44 722 
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